calculus with unrestricted cut. It can be shown that there are classes of formulae, including those encodingx the so-called \pigeon-hole principle", that have polynomial size proofs in the unrestricted KE-system (as a consequence of a result of Buss 6]) and no polynomial size proof if the rule PB is restricted to subformulae of the theorem (as a consequence of a result by Ajtai 1] implying that there are no polynomial size proofs of the pigeon-hole principle if the cut formulae are of bounded depth, i.e. with a bounded number of alternations of _ and^). However, it is obvious that the lack of control resulting from a totally unrestricted use of PB would make it useless from the point of view of implementation. It is an open problem whether between the totally unrestricted version of PB, and the very restricted one which we called \canonical", there is room for a more liberal, yet \analytic", version which is strictly more powerful in terms of the p-simulation relationship De nition 42 We say that a proof system S is an analytic cut system if (i) S is the analytic restriction of a classical cut system, and (ii) S is complete for classical logic.
Then, the proof of Proposition 40 also shows that:
Corollary 43 Every analytic cut system can linearly simulate the analytic restriction of KE.
This implies that it is only the possibility of representing (analytic) cuts and not the form of the operational rules which is crucial from a complexity viewpoint. It follows from the above corollary and Proposition 28 that:
Corollary 44 Every analytic cut system is a standard proof system. In fact, for every tautology A of length n and containing k distinct variables there is a proof , with ( ) = O(n 2 k ).
Moreover, Corollary 43, Proposition 31 and Proposition 33 imply that:
Corollary 45 Every analytic cut system can linearly simulate the tableau method, but the tableau method cannot p-simulate any analytic cut system.
Since (the classical version of) Prawitz's style natural deduction is a classical cut system, it follows that it can linearly simulate KE. Moreover, for all these systems, the simulation preserves the subformula property (i.e. it maps analytic proofs to analytic proofs). Therefore Proposition 40, together with Proposition 35, imply that Prawitz's style natural deduction and KE can linearly simulate each other with a procedure which preserves the subformula property. Corollary 45 implies that both these systems cannot be p-simulated by the tableau method, even if we restrict our attention to analytic proofs (the tableau method cannot p-simulate any analytic cut system). Finally Corollary 44 implies that, unlike the tableau method, the analytic restriction of both these systems have the same upper bound as the truth-table method.
Conclusions
We have shown that the paradigm which identi es the subformula principe with the elimination of cuts from proos is is a ected by serious anomalies, both of a conceptual and of a technical nature. On the other hand, proof systems which allow \analytic cuts" are free from such anomalies while sharing all the desirable properties of cutfree systems. In this sense analytic cut systems supersede cut-free systems as models of analytic deduction in classical logic. We have presented our own improvement of Smullyan's analytic tableau, the system KE, in which a suitably restricted use of the cut rule (PB), plays a crucial role in the formalization of classical analytic deduction. On the other hand, it is obvious that any more liberal use of the cut rule yields a proof system which may be more powerful. It may be asked whether this additional inferential power ever leads to a signi cant complexity improvement, that is whether more liberal versions would lift the system to a better complexity class in the classi cation of proof systems in terms of the p-simulation relationship. Presently a positive answer can be given only for the case of the totally unrestricted version of the rule. In this case the resulting KE-system is equivalent to the sequent Notice that in the simulation used in the proof of the previous proposition the cut formula is always a formula which occurs in the KE-refutation. So, if the latter enjoys the subformula property, its simulation in the cut system will be such that the cut formulae are all subformulae of the conclusion or of the assumptions. This holds true even if the proof as a whole does not enjoy the subformula property (for instance when the cut system in question is a Hilbert-style system). In fact, the simulation given above provides a means for transforming every proof-procedure based on the KE-rules into a proof-procedure of comparable complexity based on the rules of the given cut system. So, let us say that a proof system is a classical cut system if (i) it is sound and complete for classical logic, and (ii) it satis es conditions (C) and (XF). It is easy to show that every classical cut system satis es also the STP and, therefore, allows for an e cient implementation of the transitivity property of ordinary proofs. Notice that the de nition of a classical cut system is very general and does not assume anything about the form of the inference rules. For instance, as shown above, classical natural deduction in tree form is a classical cut system.
The next Proposition shows that every classical cut system can simulate KE without a signi cant increase in proof complexity. The simulation procedure shows that the cut inferences are restricted to formulae which occur in the simulated proof.
Proposition 40 If S is a classical cut system, then S can linearly simulate KE.
To prove the proposition it is convenient to assume that our language includes a 0-ary operator F (Falsum) and that the proof systems include suitable rules to deal with it 14 . For KE this involves only adding the obvious rule which allows us to append F to any branch containing both A and :A for some formula A, so that every closed branch in a KE-tree ends with a node labelled with F. The assumption is made only for convenience's sake and can be dropped without consequence. Moreover we shall make the obvious assumption that, for every system S, the complexity of a proof of A from A in S is equal to 1.
Let ( ) denote the number of nodes generated by a KE-refutation of ? (i.e. the assumptions are not counted) 15 . Let S be a classical cut system. If S is complete, then for every rule r of KE there is an S-proof r of the conclusion of r from its premises.
Let b 1 = Max r ( ( r )) and let b 2 and b 3 be the constants representing, respectively, the -cost of simulating classical cut in S | associated with condition (C) above | and the -cost of simulating the ex falso inference scheme in S | associated with condition (XF) above. As mentioned before, every classical cut system satis es also condition STP and it is easy to verify that the constant associated with this condition, representing the -cost of simulating \absolute" cut in S, is b 2 + b 3 + 1. We set c = b 1 + b 2 + b 3 + 1.
The Proposition is an immediate consequence of the following Lemma:
Lemma 41 For every classical cut system S, if there is a KE-refutation of ?, then there is an S-proof 0 of F from ? with ( 0 ) c ( ). Proof The proof is by induction on ( ), where is a KE-refutation of ?.
( ) = 1. Then ? is explicitly inconsistent, i.e. contains a pair of complementary formulae, say B and :B, and the only node generated by the refutation is F, which is obtained by means of an application of the KE-rule for F to B and :B. Since there is an S-proof of the KE-rule for F, we can obtain an S-proof 0 of the particular application contained in simply by performing the suitable substitutions and ( 0 ) b 1 < c.
( ) > 1. Case 1. The KE-refutation has the form:
14 Systems which are not already de ned over a language containing F can usually be rede ned over such an extended language without di culty. 15 The reader should be aware that our -measure applies to KE-refutations and not to trees: the same tree can represent di erent refutations yielding di erent values of the -measure.
We also require the method to be also computationally feasible. So, the standard way of grafting proofs of subsidiary conclusions in Natural Deduction proofs, though providing a uniform method, does not satisfy the feasibility condition. The rules of Natural Deduction, however, permit us to bypass this di culty and produce a method satisfying the whole of STP. Consider the rule of Non-Constructive Dilemma (NCD):
This is a derived rule in Prawitz's style Natural Deduction which yields classical logic if added to the intuitionistically valid rules (see 34, section 4.5]). By \derived rule" here we mean that every application of NCD can be eliminated in a xed number of steps (the expression \derived rule" is often used in the literature in a much more liberal sense), as shown by the following construction:
A _ :A In analogy with the STP we can formulate a condition requiring a proof system to simulate e ciently another form of cut which holds for classical systems and is closely related to the rule PB:
(C) Let 1 be a proof of B from ?; A and 2 be a proof of B from ; :A. Then there is a uniform method for constructing from 1 and 2 a proof 3 of B from ?; such that ( 3 ) ( 1 ) + ( 2 ) + c for some constant c.
Similarly, the next condition requires that proof systems can e ciently simulate the ex falso inference scheme:
(XF) Let 1 be a proof of A from ? and 2 be a proof of :A from . Then there is a uniform method for constructing from 1 and 2 a proof 3 of B from ?; , for any B, such that ( 3 ) ( 1 ) + ( 2 ) + c for some constant c.
Corollary 38 The standard tableau method cannot p-simulate the tableau method with lemma generation. Moreover, it is obvious that such asymmetric rules are equivalent to a combination of strongly analytic applications of PB and of the KE-elimination rules, as shown in the diagram used to show Proposition 31 above. Hence:
Proposition 39 The strongly analytic restriction of KE linearly simulates the tableau method with lemma generation. It is misleading, however, to refer to tableaux with the asymmetric rules as to \tableaux with lemma generation". The use of this terminology conveys the idea that the additional formula appendend to one side of the branching rules is a \lemma", namely that the sub-tableau below the other side is closed or may be closed. In contrast, tableau rules can be used also for enumerating all the models of a satis able set of formulae, and not only for refuting unsatis able sets. In the former case the sub-tableau in question may well be open, so that the appended formula is not a \lemma". The fact that we can append it without loss of soundness, does not depend on its being a lemma, but merely on the principle of bivalence. In any case, the appended formula provides additional information which can be used below to close every branch containing its complement. As a result, the enumeration of models is non-redundant, in the sense that it does not generate models which are subsumed one by the other, since all the models resulting from the enumeration are mutually exclusive.
Thus the strongly analytic restriction of KE is su cient to simulate e ciently the best known enhancements of the tableau method, simply by making an appropriate use of the cut rule. We stress once again that the KE-system cannot be identi ed with its strongly analytic restriction. In fact, less restricted notions of proof may be more powerful from the complexity viewpoint and still obey the subformula principle. We have mentioned Beckert's examples (Section 3 above) suggesting that the analytic restriction of KE might be strictly more powerful than its strongly analytic restriction (therefore also than tableaux with merging and tableaux with lemma generation) with respect to the p-simulation relationship.
A more general view
As seen in the previous section, the speed-up of KE over the tableau method can be traced to the fact that KE, unlike the tableau method, can easily simulate inference steps based on \cuts", as in the example on p. 24. In other words, it satis es our strong transitivity principle (STP), the required procedure being the one described in the same section. Some formal systems (like the tableau method and the cut-free sequent calculus) do not satisfy the STP, some others satisfy it in a non-obvious way. Notice that the existence of a uniform procedure for grafting proofs of subsidiary conclusions or lemmata, in the proof of a theorem is just one condition of the STP. The other condition requires that such a procedure be computationally easy. In Natural Deduction, for instance, replacing every occurrence of an assumption A with its proof provides an obvious grafting method which, though very perspicuous, is highly ine cient, leading to much unwanted duplication in the resulting proof-tree. Corollary 36 The standard tableau method cannot p-simulate the tableau method with merging. Moreover, as discussed above in Section 2, the use of PB as a branching rule, instead of the standard branching rules of tableaux, removes the redundancy of the tableau rules by making all the branches in the tree mutually inconsistent. As a result, the redundant branches which are stopped via merging are not generated in a KE-tree (see the example in Figure 4 ). The example shows that the applications of PB required to simulate merging are strongly analytic. These considerations establish the following fact:
Proposition 37 The strongly analytic restriction of KE linearly simulates the tableau method with merging. Notice that the redundancy of the tableau method is avoided by the very nature of the KE-rules without any need for external ad hoc moves.
What is usually called \lemma generation" is equivalent to replacing the branching rules of the standard tableau method with corresponding asymmetric ones. 
KE and other re nements of analytic tableaux
The computational redundancy discussed in Section 2 is well-known to anybody who has worked with Smullyan's tableaux in the area of automated deduction. It is usually avoided by augmenting the standard tableau rules with extra \control" features which stop the expansion of redundant paths in the tree or license the generation of \lemmas" to be used in closing redundant branches. One consequence of the separation result in Proposition 1 is that some correction of the tableau rules is not just a discretional \optimization" step, but a necessary condition for a respectable tableau-like system. The main \enhancements" of Smullyan's tableaux which are currently taken into consideration in the area of automated deduction are usually called merging and lemma generation (see 5, 21]). The technique called \merging" can be easily de ned in terms of our discussion of the redundancy of analytic tableaux. If for any two nodes n; m, such that n 6 m (namely n and m lie on di erent branches), we have n m then one can stop pursuing the branch through m without loss of completeness.
On the other hand, it is easy to see that if merging is employed, the hard examples of Section 2 can be solved by tableaux of polynomial size. This is su cient to establish
KE versus Natural Deduction
It can also be shown that KE can linearly simulate natural deduction (in tree form).
Moreover the simulation procedure preserves the subformula property. We shall sketch this procedure for the natural deduction system given in 26], the procedure being similar for other formulations.
We want to give an e ective proof of the following Proposition (where ND stands A detailed study of proof-search in the KE-system will have to involve more sophisticated criteria for the choice of the PB-formulae. Here we just stress that, no matter how this choice is made, the (canonical restriction of the) KE-system can never perform signi cantly worse than the tableau method. This is a consequence of the fact that the simulation of the tableau rules by means of the KE-rules is independent of the choice of the PB-formulae. On the other hand a good choice may sometimes be crucial for generating essentially shorter proofs than those generated by the tableau method (sometimes it does not matter at all: the examples of Proposition 1 which are \hard"
for the tableau method, are \easy" for the canonical restriction of KE no matter how the PB-formulae are chosen). In any case, our discussion shows that analytic cuts are often essential for the existence of short refutations with the subformula property in the other. Now, on the rst branch, by means of n=2 applications of the rule E_1 we obtain a set of formulae which is of the same form as H m?1 . Similarly on the second branch we obtain another set of the same form as H m?1 . By reiterating the same procedure we eventually produce a closed tree for the original set H m . It is easy to see that the number of nodes generated by the refutation can be calculated as follows (where n is the number of formulae in H m , namely 2 m ):
2 i + n = n + 2 1 ? 2 log n?1 1 ? 2 + n (log n ? 1) = n + n log n ? 2: This result also shows that the truth-tables cannot p-simulate KE in non-trivial cases 12 . Figure 3 shows the KE-refutation in the case m = 3. Remark 34 This class of examples also illustrates an interesting phenomenon: while the complexity of KE-refutations is not sensitive to the order in which the elimination rules are applied, it can be, in certain cases, highly sensitive to the choice of the PB formulae. If we make the \wrong" choices, a combinatorial explosion may result when \short" refutations are possible by making di erent choices. If, in Cook and Rechow's examples, the rule PB is applied always to the \wrong" atomic variable, namely to the last one in each clause, it is not di cult to see that the size of the tree becomes exponential. To avoid this phenomenon an obvious criterion suggests itself from the study of this example, at least for the case in which the input formulae are in clausal form. We express it in the form of a heuristic principle:
HP Let be a branch to which none of the linear KE-rules is applicable. Let S be the set of clauses occurring in the branch , and let P 1 ; : : : ; P k be the list of all the atomic formulae occurring in S . Let N PI be the number of clauses C such that P I or :P i occurs in C. Then apply PB to an atom P i such that N Pi is maximal. If this principle is applied, we can be sure that the \right" PB-choices are always made. T 1 where the subrefutation T 2 is repeated n times in the lefthand tree and the subrefutation T 1 is repeated m times in the righthand tree. When A is a subformula of some formula in ?; , the \elimination of cuts" from the tableau proof does not remove \impure" inferences, involving external formulae, but \pure" analytic inferences, involving only elements contained in the data.
Because of this intrinsically ine cient way of dealing with analytic cut inferences, examples can be found which require a great deal of duplication in the construction of a closed tableau. We have already discussed a class of hard examples in section 2 which are easy not only for (the canonical restriction of) KE but also for the truth-table method. By Proposition 1 above, the tableau method cannot p-simulate the truthtables. Therefore, in spite of their similarity, the analytic restriction of KE is much more powerful than the tableau method, even in the domain of analytic deduction. This fact already follows from Proposition 1, Propositions 28 and 31. Moreover, it is not di cult to see that the class of hard examples for the tableau method used in the proof of Proposition 1 is easy also for the canonical restriction of KE. Figure 2 shows a canonical KE-refutation of the set of clauses H P1;P2;P3 . It is apparent that, in general, the number of branches in the KE-tree for H P1;:::;P k , constructed according to the same pattern, is exactly 2 k?1 (which is the number of clauses in the expression divided by 2) and that the refutation trees have size O(k 2 k ). This is su cient to establish:
Notice that the applications of PB are strongly analytic. Such a simulation lengthens the original tableau by one node for each application of a branching rule. Since the linear rules of the tableau method are also rules of KE, it follows that there is a KErefutation T 0 of ? such that (T 0 ) (T ) + k, where k is the number of applications of branching rules in T . Since k is obviously (T ), then (T 0 ) 2 (T ).
It also follows from Proposition 31 and Proposition 29 that:
Proposition 32 The canonical restriction of KE p-simulates the tableau method.
We remark that, according to the above proposition, a particularly strong restriction of KE, corresponding to a \mechanical procedure", can easily simulate the tableau method.
Notice that the KE-simulation contains more information than the simulated tableau. In the KE-simulation of the branching rules, one of the branches contains a formula which does not occur in the corresponding branch of the tableau. These additional formulae never increase signi cantly the size of refutations while, in many cases, can reduce it dramatically. The additional formula may allow for the closure of branches that, in the simulated tableau, remain open and are closed only after a long redundant computation. So, while all the tableau rules can be easily simulated by means of KE-rules, KE includes a rule, namely PB, which cannot be easily simulated by means of the tableau rules. Although it is well-known that the addition of this rule to the tableau rules does not increase the stock of inferences that can be shown valid (since PB is classically valid and the tableau method is classically complete), its absence, in some cases, is responsible for an explosive growth in the size of tableau proofs. In section 2 we have already identi ed the source of this combinatorial explosion. Here we discuss in some more detail the relation between the ine ciency of the tableau rules and their failure to simulate \analytic cut" inferences. Proof The proposition trivially follows from the fact that the E-rules have the subformula property and there are no more that n distinct subformulae of the formulae in . It is not di cult to see that at most O(n 2 ) pattern matchings need to be performed.
Therefore, the complexity of a tautology depends entirely on the number of PBbranchings which are required in order to complete the tree. Let us call KE(k) the system obtained from KE by allowing at most k nested analytic applications of the cut-rule. We have just shown that KE(0) has a decision procedure which runs in time O(n 2 ). The set for which KE(0) is complete includes the horn-clause fragment of propositional logic (however KE(0) is not restricted to clausal form logic). Moreover, it is not di cult to show that:
Proposition 30 For every xed k, KE(k) has a polynomial time decision procedure. The proof is left to the reader. (Hint: in any KE(k)-tree there are at most 2 k ? 1 applications of PB. Let n be the length of the initial set of formulae. There are at most n distinct subformulae of the initial formulae and, therefore, at most n (2 k ?1) possible arrangements of the PB-applications. Recall that k is a xed constant and the task of E-completing a branch can be performed in polynomial time.)
It is obvious that the set of tautologies for which KE(k) is complete tends to TAUT, the set of all the tautologies, as k tends to in nity. The crucial point is that low-degree cut-bounded systems are powerful enough for a wide range of applications. In a subsequent paper we shall investigate this sequence of cut-bounded logics. Notice that in our approach, the source of the complexity of proving a tautology in the system is clearly identi ed, and quite large fragments of classical logic can be covered with a very limited number of applications of the branching rule PB (even with no applications of PB, most of the \textbook examples" can be proved). Nothing similar applies to the tableau method, where the fragments obtained by limiting the application of the branching rules are extremely weak.
KE versus the tableau method
First we notice that, given a tableau refutation T of ? we can e ectively construct a strongly analytic KE-refutation T 0 of ? which is not essentially longer. Proposition 31 If there is a tableau proof T of A from ?, then there is a strongly analytic KE-proof T 0 of A from ? such that (T 0 ) 2 (T ). Proof Observe that the elimination rules of KE, combined with PB, can easily simulate the branching rules of the tableau method. For instance in the case of the branching rule for eliminating disjunctions either of the following two simulations can be used (all the other cases are similar):
Now, observe that the -measure is su cient to establish negative results about the p-simulation relation, but is not su cient in general for positive results. It may, however, be adequate also for positive results whenever one can show that themeasure (the length of lines) is not signi cantly increased by the simulation procedure under consideration. All the procedures that we shall consider in the sequel will be of this kind. So we shall forget about the -measure and identify the complexity of a proof system with the -measure.
As said before, we are interested in the complexity not of proofs in general but of analytic proofs. We shall then speak of the analytic restriction of a system, i.e. the rules are restricted to applications which preserve the subformula property.
Notice that the analytic restrictions of Gentzen's sequent calculus and natural deduction are strictly more powerful than the cut-free sequent calculus and normal natural deduction respectively. For instance, the analytic restriction of the sequent calculus allows cuts provided they are restricted to subformule.
In what follows we shall consider the version of KE which uses unsigned formulae.
KE and the truth-tables
The complexity of the truth-table procedure for a given formula A is sometimes measured by the number of rows in the complete truth-table for that formula, i.e.
2 k , where k is the number of distinct atomic formulae in A. In fact, a better way of measuring the complexity of the truth-tables takes into account also the length of the formula to be tested. In any case, it is important to notice that the complexity of the truth-table procedure is not always exponential in the length of the formula. It is so only when the number of distinct atoms approaches the length of the formula. On the contrary, the complexity of tableau proofs depends more crucially on the length of the formula. Therefore, there might be (and in fact there are, as pointed out in Section 2 above) examples which are \easy" for the truth-tables and \hard" for the tableau method. We described this situation as unnatural. We can turn these considerations into a positive criterion and require that a well-designed proof system should be able, at least, to p-simulate the truth-tables, i.e. the most basic semantical and computational characterization of classical propositional logic.
De nition 27 Let us say that a proof system is standard if its complexity is O(n c 2 k ), where n is the length of the input formula, c is a xed constant and k the number of distinct variables occurring in it. The above de nition requires that the complexity of the truth-tables be an upper bound on the complexity of an acceptable proof system. Proposition 28 The analytic restriction of KE is a standard proof system. In fact, for every tautology A of length n and containing k distinct variables, there is a KErefutation T of :A with (T ) = O( (T )) = O(n 2 k ) Proof (Sketched) There is an easy KE-simulation of the truth-table procedure.
First apply PB to all atomic letters on each branch. This generates a tree with 2 k branches. Then each branch can be closed by means of a KE-tree of linear size. (Hint: each truth-table rule can be simulated in a xed number of steps.) Notice that the applications of PB required for the proof, though analytic, are not strongly analytic.
Davis-Putnam procedure (when represented in tree form, as in 9, Section 4.6] and in 18, Section 4.4]). All we need is to generalize our language so as to include n-ary disjunctions, with arbitrary n, and modify the rule for _-elimination in the obvious way.
Notice that the system resulting from this generalized version of KE by disallowing the branching rule PB (so that all the rules are linear) includes unit resolution as a special case. This restricted version of KE can then be seen as an extension of unit resolution (it is therefore a complete system for Horn clauses, although it is not con ned to formulae in clausal form). Although its scope largely exceeds that of unit resolution, the procedure is still feasible as shown by Proposition 29 below.
In this paper we are concerned with propositional logic only. We just remark that an extension of KE to rst-order is trivially obtained by introducing the usual quanti er rules of the tableau method. In formulating a refutation procedure to be used in practical applications, Skolem functions, uni cation and other improvements can be employed exactly as with the standard tableau method. The reader is referred to 18] on this topic. Speci c problems related to rst-order logic (most interestingly to the use of function symbols in analytic deductions) will be treated in a subsequent paper.
The complexity of KE
In this section we discuss the complexity of analytic KE-refutations. We rst show that, unlike the tableau method, the analytic KE system can p-simulate the truthtables. Next we brie y discuss the complexity of proof-search in a hierarchy of subsystems arising by allowing only a xed number of applications of the cut-rule (PB).
Then we compare the analytic, strongly analytic and canonical restrictions of KE with other analytic proof systems (i.e. systems obeying the subformula principle). Some systems of deduction | such as tableau method and Gentzen's sequent calculus without cut | yield only analytic proofs. Others | such as Natural Deduction, Gentzen's sequent calculus with cut and KE| allow for a more general notion of proof which includes non-analytic proofs, although in all these cases the systems obtained by restricting the potentially non-analytic rules to analytic applications are still complete. Since we are interested, for theoretical and practical reasons, in analytic proofs, we shall pay special attention to simulation procedures which preserve the subformula property.
De nition 26 The length of a proof , denoted by j j is the total number of symbols occurring in (intended as a string). The -complexity, of , denoted by ( ), is the number of lines in the proof (each \line" being a sequent, a formula, or any other expression associated with an inference step, depending on the system under consideration). Finally the -complexity of , denoted by ( ) is the length (total number of symbols) of a line of maximal length occurring in .
Our complexity measures are obviously connected by the relation j j ( ) ( ):
has exhibited a class of formulae which admit polynomial size analytic proofs, but do not seem to admit any polynomial size strongly analytic proof. These examples will be discussed in a subsequent work.
In fact, the canonical procedure imposes even more control on the applications of the cut-rule PB by requiring that it is applied on a branch only when the linear elimination rules are no further applicable, i.e. when the branch is E-completed. This strategy avoids unnecessary branchings which may increase the size of proofs, very much like, in the standard tableau method, the basic strategy consisting in applying the -elimination rule before the -elimination rule, allows for slimmer tableaux 9 . Such a stricter notion of an analytic KE-tree is captured by the following de nition: De nition 24 We say that an application of PB in a branch is canonical if (i) it is strongly analytic, and (ii) is E-completed. We also say that a KE-tree is canonical if all the applications of PB in it are canonical.
Canonical KE-trees are exactly those which are generated by our canonical procedure described above. Hence:
Corollary 25 If S is unsatis able, then there is a closed canonical KE-tree for S.
The canonical procedure for KE is closely related to the Davis-Putnam procedure.
This was introduced in 1960 17] and later re ned in 16]. It was meant as an ecient theorem proving method 10 for (prenex normal form) rst-order logic, but it was soon recognized that it combined an e cient test for truth-functional validity with a wasteful search through the Herbrand universe
11
. This situation was later remedied by the emergence of uni cation. However, at the propositional level, the procedure is still considered among the most e cient, and is clearly connected with the resolution method, so that Robinson's resolution 27] can be viewed as a (non-deterministic) combination of the Davis-Putnam propositional module and uni cation, in a single inference rule. It is not di cult to see that, if we extend our language to deal with \generalized" (n-ary) disjunctions and conjunctions, the Davis-Putnam procedure (in the version of 16] which is also the one exposed in 9, Section 4.6] and in Fitting's textbook 18, Section 4.4]), can be represented as a special case of the canonical procedure for KE. So, from this point of view, the canonical procedure for KE provides a generalization of the Davis-Putnam procedure which does not require reduction in clausal form. To see that the DPP is a special case of the canonical procedure for KE observe that, if we restrict ourselves to formulae in clausal form, every branch in a canonical KE-tree performs what essentially is a unit-resolution refutation 8].
On the other hand, in this special case, PB corresponds to the splitting rule of the 9 Since in our approach all the elimination rules are linear, it does not make any di erence whether, in applying them, we give priority to formulae of type or . Of course, one may describe a similar strategy for the standard tableau method, by giving priority to -expansions or -expansions applied to formulae such that either c 1 or c 2 occurs above in the branch. In this way one of the branches of the -expansion closes immediately. In fact, it is much more natural to describe such inferences in terms of the KE linear rules. But, when non-trivial branchings are involved, the tableau rules cannot simulate our PB-branchings. 10 The version given in 17] (like our canonical procedure outlined above) was not in fact a completely deterministic procedure: it involved the choice of which literal to eliminate at each step. Such choices may crucially a ect the complexity of the resulting refutation.
11 See 15].
Of course, what we have called \the canonical procedure" is not, strictly speaking, a completely deterministic algorithm. Some steps involve a choice and di erent strategies for making these choices will lead to di erent algorithms. However it describes a \mechanical version" of KE which is su cient for our purpose of comparing it with the tableau method. We can look at it as to a restricted proof system, where the power of the cut rule is severely limited to allow for easy proof-search Corollary 21 (Analytic cut property) If S is unsatis able, then there is a closed KE-tree T 0 for S such that all the applications of PB preserve the subformula property.
Proof All the PB-formulae involved in the canonical procedure are subformulae of formulae previously occurring in the branch.
Let us call analytic the applications of PB which preserve the subformula property, and analytic restriction of KE the system obtained by restricting PB to analytic applications. The above corollary says that the analytic restriction of KE is complete.
Since the elimination rules preserve the subformula property, the subformula principle follows immediately. A constructive proof of the subformula principle, which yields a procedure for transforming any KE-proof in an equivalent KE-proof which enjoys the subformula property, is given in 24].
In fact the use of PB in the canonical procedure is even more restricted than it appears from the above corollary. Consider the following de nition of strongly analytic application of PB.
De nition 22 An application of PB in a branch of a KE-tree is strongly analytic if the PB-formulae of this application are i and c i for some i = 1; 2 and some nonful lled formula of type occurring in . A KE-tree is strongly analytic if it contains only strongly analytic applications of PB. All the applications of PB in the canonical procedure are strongly analytic. Thus, it follows from the completeness of the canonical procedure that:
Corollary 23 If S is unsatis able, then there is a closed strongly analytic KE-tree for S.
In other words, our argument establishes the completeness of the restricted system obtained by replacing the \liberal" version of PB with one which allows only strongly analytic applications. In general, analytic applications of PB do not need to be strongly analytic. The PB-formulae may well be subformulae of some formula occurring above in the branch, and yet not satisfy the strongly analytic restriction. Therefore, Corollary 23 is stronger than Corollary 21. One can ask whether the strongly analytic restriction is as powerful, from the complexity viewpoint, as the analytic restriction. B. Beckert (personal communication) has recently conjectured that, in fact, the strongly analytic restriction cannot p-simulate the analytic restriction and 1. We say that a formula is E-analysed in a branch if either (i) it is of type and both 1 and 2 occur in ; or (ii) it is of type and the following are satis ed: (iia) if c 1 occurs in , then 2 occurs in ; (iib) if c 2 occurs in , then 1 occurs in . 2. We say that a branch is E-completed if all the formulae occurring in it are E-analysed.
A branch which is E-completed is a branch in which the linear elimination rules of KE have been applied in all possible ways. It may not be completed in the stronger sense of the following de nition.
De nition 18
1. We say that a formula of type is ful lled in a branch if either 1 or 2 occurs in . 2. We say that a branch is completed if it is E-completed and, moreover, every formula of type occurring in is ful lled.
3. We say that a KE-tree is completed if all its branches are completed. Procedure 19 The canonical procedure for KE starts from the one-branch tree consisting of the initial formulae and applies the KE-rules until the resulting tree is either closed or completed. At each stage of the construction the following steps are performed:
1. select an open branch which is not yet completed (in the sense of De nition 18); 2. if is not E-completed, expand by means of the E-rules until it becomes E-completed; 3. if the resulting branch 0 is neither closed nor completed then (a) select a formula of type which is not yet ful lled (in the in sense of De nition 18) in the branch; (b) apply PB with 1 and c 1 (or, equivalently, 2 and c 2 ) as PB-formulae and go to step 1. otherwise, go to step 1.
Proposition 20 The canonical procedure is complete. Proof It is easy to see that the canonical procedure eventually yields a KE-tree which is either closed or completed. The only crucial observation is that when one applies the rule PB as prescribed, with i and c i as PB-formulae (with i equals 1 or 2 and a non-ful lled formula occurring in the branch), then once the two resulting branches are E-completed as a result of performing step 2, each of them will contain either 1 or 2 . Therefore, eventually, each branch will be either closed or completed. Since the formulae in a completed branch form a Hintikka set, the completeness of KE follows immediately via Hintikka's lemma.
A positive answer to this question can be obtained by describing a systematic refutation procedure for the KE-system in which the applications of PB are restricted to analytic ones. This procedure, like the similar one for the standard tableau method, terminates either with a closed tree or with an open tree such that its open branches describe countermodels to the initial set of formulae.
It is convenient to use Smullyan's unifying notation in order to reduce the number of cases to be considered. This notation is summarized in the next two tables. The Rule A can be seen as a pair of branch-expansion rules, one with conclusion 1 and the other with conclusion 2 . In each application of the rules, the signed formulae and are called major premises. In each application of rules B1 and B2 the signed formulae c i , i = 1; 2, are called minor premises (rule A has no minor premise).
Remark 16 The unifying notation can be easily adapted to unsigned formulae: simply delete all the signs \T " and replace all the signs \F " by \:". The \packed" version of the rules then suggests a more economical version of KE for unsigned This version is to be preferred for practical applications.
We now outline a simple refutation procedure for KE that we call the canonical procedure. First we de ne some related notions.
De nition 17 This kind of proof provides a simulation of a standard axiomatic system. In this simulation it is essential to apply the rule PB to formulae which are not subformulae of the theorem to be proved. We notice that such a simulation cannot be directly obtained by the tableau method, since it is non-analytic. This brings us back to our Problem 4 above: are such non-analytic applications of PB necessary or can they be eliminated without loss of completeness? i.e. can we restrict ourselves to analytic applications? Let us say that a KE-tree T for ? is analytic if PB is applied in T only to (proper) subformulae of formulae in ?. Let us call analytic restriction of KE the system in which the applications of PB are restricted to subformulae of the formulae occurring above in the same branch. So Problem 4 consists in asking: is the analytic restriction of KE complete? Table 1 : KE rules for unsigned formulae.
In Fig. 1 we give a KE-refutation (using unsigned formulae) and compare it with a minimal tableau for the same set of formulae; the reader can compare the di erent structure of the two refutations and the crucial use of (the unsigned version of) PB to eliminate the redundancy exhibited by the tableau refutation. Notice that the thicker subtree in the tableau refutation is clearly redundant. Remark 10 If we impose the condition that the elimination rules have a linear format, i.e. they do not generate a branching in the tree, the E-rules of KE are the only simple elimination rules which can be read o the truth-tables for the logical operators. On the other hand, PB expresses the bivalent character of the underlying notion of truth, while the closure rule expresses the principle of non-contradiction.
Therefore the KE rules are clearly rooted in the classical truth-tables. This is not the case with the tableau rules which, as argued above, do not express the Principle of Bivalence 7 .
We can, of course, give a version of KE which works with unsigned formulae.
The rules are shown in Table 1 . It is intended that all de nitions be modi ed in the obvious way. We can see from the unsigned version that the two-premise rules correspond to familiar principles of inference: modus ponens, modus tollens, disjunctive syllogism and the dual of disjunctive syllogism. Thus KE can be seen as a system of classical natural dedution using elimination rules only. However, the classical operators are analysed as such and not as \stretched" versions of the constructive ones ( 
Principle of Bivalence T(A) F(A) PB
The rules involving the logical operators will be called elimination rules or E-rules. 6 In contrast with the tableau rules for the same logical operators, the E-rules are all of the linear type and are not a complete set of rules for classical propositional logic. The reason is easy to see. The E-rules, intended as \operational rules" which govern our use of the logical operators do not say anything about the bivalent structure of the intended models. If we add the rule PB as the only rule of the branching type, completeness is achieved. So PB is not eliminable in the system KE. As pointed out in section 2, there is a close correspondence between the semantic rule PB and the cut rule of the sequent calculus. We shall return to this point in section 5.2.
We call an application of PB a PB-inference and the formulae which are the conclusions of the PB-inference PB-formulae. Finally, if TA and FA are the conclusions Furthermore, if Problem 4 has a positive solution, we shall be anyway left with a large choice of formulae as potential conclusions of an application of PB (let us call them PB-formulae). This may be a problem for the development of systematic refutation procedures. Thus we have to address also the following:
Problem 5 Can we further restrict the set of potential PB-formulae so as to allow for simple systematic refutation procedures, like the standard procedure for the tableau method?
In the sequel we shall see how all these problems have a simple positive solution.
To solve Problem 3 we need only to notice that the following eleven facts hold true under any boolean valuation: These facts can immediately be used to provide a set of expansion rules of the linear type which, with the addition of PB, constitute a complete set of rules for classical propositional logic.
These rules characterize the propositional fragment of the system KE ( rst proposed in 23, 24]) and are shown below. Notice that those with two signed formulae below the line represent a pair of expansion rules of the linear type, one for each sigend formula.
Problem 2 Is there a refutation system which, though being \close" to the tableau method, is not a ected by the anomalies of cut-free systems? Observe that the non-redundancy condition in (2) is obviously ful lled by any treemethod satisfying the stronger condition that distinct branches de ne mutually exclusive situations, i.e. contain inconsistent sets of formulae. It is obvious that the simplest rule of the branching type which generates mutually inconsistent branches is a 0-premise rule, that we call PB, corresponding to the principle of bivalence: We could, of course, simply \throw in" this rule, leaving the tableau rules unchanged. It is easy to see that with this addition the tableau method is turned into a system which satis es our strong transitivity principle and, therefore, overcomes what we have called \the proof-theoretical problem". Moreover, the rule PB is nothing but a semantic reading of the cut rule as a principle of bivalence. Therefore, also the \semantic" anomaly would be solved. Furthermore, it is not di cult, by using the above rule in conjunction with the usual tableau rules, to construct short refutations of our \hard examples" described in the previous section. Indeed, any proof system including a cut rule can polynomially simulate the truth-tables (see below, Section 5). Thus also the computational anomaly would be solved. However, such a \solution" is not satisfactory. In the rst place, it is clearly ad hoc. The tableau method is complete without the cut rule and it is not clear when such a rule should be used in a systematic refutation procedure. The \mechanics" of the tableau method does not seem to accommodate the cut rule in any natural way. Secondly, the standard branching rules do not satisfy our non-redundancy condition (2), which we identi ed as a desideratum for a well-designed refutation system.
The above considerations suggest that in a well-designed tableau method: (a) the cut rule (PB) should not be redundant and (b) it should be the only branching rule. Thus, a good solution to Problem 2 may consist in overturning the cut-free tradition: instead of eliminating cuts from proofs we assign the cut rule a central role and reformulate the elimination rules accordingly.
Given (a) and (b) above, Problem 2 reduces to the following:
Problem 3 Are there simple elimination rules of linear type which combined with PB yield a refutation system for classical logic? However, since a 0-premise rule like PB can introduce arbitrary formulae, we need also to solve:
Problem 4 Can we restrict ourselves to analytic applications of PB, i.e. applications which do not violate the subformula property, without a ecting completeness?
, , l l L n for expressions in clausal form, it is obvious that the branches do not represent mutually inconsistent alternatives. As a result, when expanding the tree, one may (and very often do) end up considering more cases than is necessary. For instance, after applying the rule for analysing A _ B, while expanding the tableau below B one may have to consider possible models in which A is true. But all these possibile models are also enumerated below A, so that the enumeration process is redundant. On the other hand, bivalence is clearly incorporated in the truth-table analysis where all the possible assignments are mutually exclusive. The situation is best illustrated as follows: let be the partial ordering of the nodes of a tableau T, and l the labelling function of T (namely for every node n, l(n) yields the formula which labels n). Let us now de ne, for every node n: n = fA : l(m) = A and m ng:
In other words n is the set of all formulae which occur above n in the same branch. Thus, in the development of a tableau, every node n occurring in an open branch de nes a set n which may or may not be expandable into a Hintikka (i.e. downward saturated) set. We have, of course, that for all nodes n; m n m implies n m :
(1)
It would be reasonable to require that the converse also hold, namely n 6 m implies n 6 m (2) so that nodes in di erent branches (i.e. nodes n; m such that n 6 m and m 6 n) are associated with incomparable expansions of the input set (i.e. such that n 6 m and m 6 n ). However, the tableau rules do not satisfy the simple non-redundancy condition in (2) and, therefore, lead to a very redundant enumeration of the possible cases. The reader can easily check that the failure of satisfying condition (2) is at the origin of the combinatorial explosion of analytic tableaux in the hard examples mentioned above. This kind of redundancy has been occasionally noticed, and several proof-engineering techniques have been proposed to avoid it (see below, Section 5.4).
In the sequel we shall illustrate how this computational anomaly, as well as the others, can be dealt with in proof-theoretical terms by reconsidering the role of the cut rule in analytic deductions.
3 The system KE The discussion in the previous section leaves us with the following problem:
in the expressions, namely 2 k . In other words, this class of expressions is not \hard" for the truth-table method. However it can be shown (see 13]) that it is hard for the tableau method. More precisely, let C(k) be the number of interior (i.e. non-leaf) nodes in a minimal closed tableau for H P1;:::;P k . Then, a simple analysis shows that C(k) is determined exactly by the following equation: . One immediate consequence of this result is that analytic tableaux do not even provide, at least in their \pure" form given them by Smullyan, a uniform improvement on the truth-table method as far as computational complexity is concerned. This anomaly appears to be much more compelling than the well-known speed-up of the sequent calculus with cut over the sequent calculus without cut. It is something of a \computational scandal" that the cut-free system (and the tableau method) should be, in some cases, so embarassingly outperformed by such a simple and mechanical device as the truth-table method. Moreover, the latter is nothing but a direct implementation of the very semantic de nition of logical truth. Therefore, the result expressed in Proposition 1 clearly brings out the computational content of the \semantic anomaly" discussed above, namely the discrepancy between the tableau rules and their intended semantics.
We relate this anomaly to a basic inadequacy of the tableau branching rules | and in general of the rules formulated in the tradition of Gentzen's (cut-free) sequent calculus | which, as argued above, do not capture the essentials of classical semantics.
The elimination of bivalence from the semantics of tableau proofs has the undesired e ect that the possible cases enumerated in the tableau analysis are not mutually exclusive. When applying the typical tableau branching rules: For the same reasons, one might think that what we have called \the proof-theoretical" and the \semantical" anomalies are also totally irrelevant to the problem of mechanical proof. Tableau \proofs" do not satisfy our strong transitivity principle just because they enjoy the subformula property which, on the other hand, is highly desirable for the formulation of mechanical proof procedures. But is this an accurate picture? Here what we have called \the computational anomaly" comes into play. It takes the following, somewhat surprising, form: there are propositional problems for which such a simple mechanical device as the truth-table method performs incomparably better (in a precise mathematical sense) than Smullyan's analytic tableaux. In fact, it can be shown that analytic tableaux cannot polynomially simulate the truth-tables. That a proof system S 2 polynomially simulates (or p-simulates for short) another proof system S 1 means, informally, that there is a function computable in polynomial time which maps every proof of a formula A in S 1 to a proof of the same formula in S 2 .
Two proof-systems are considered equally powerful, from the complexity viewpoint, if they can p-simulate each other. Of course, if S 2 can p-simulate S 1 , then for every formula A, the length of the shortest S 2 -proof of A must be bounded above by a polynomial function of the length of the shortest S 1 -proof of A. Thus, if there is an in nite set H of formulae with S 1 -proofs of size O(f(n)), and one can prove that the length of their shortest S 2 -proofs cannot be bounded above by any polynomial function of f(n), then one can conclude that S 2 cannot p-simulate S 1 . (For the formal de nitions and the resulting classi cation see 10, 11, 36] .) The examples used in 13] to show the speed-up of the truth-tables over Smullyan's tableaux are expressions in conjunctive normal form, de ned as follows: given a sequence of k atomic variables P 1 ; : : : ; P k , consider all the possible clauses containing as members, for each i = 1; 2; : : :; k, either P i or :P i and no other member. There are 2 k of such clauses. Let H P1;:::;P k denote the set containing these 2 k clauses. The expression V H P1;:::;P k is unsatis able. For instance, V H P1;P2 is the following expression in CNF:
(P 1 _ P 2 )^(P 1 _ :P 2 )^(:P 1 _ P 2 )^(:P 1 _ :P 2 ):
Notice that in this case the truth-table procedure contains as many rows as clauses adequately represented by cut-free proofs is higly questionable. We shall argue that the di erence between analytic and non-analytic deductions is best represented not in terms of the presence or absence of the cut rule, but in terms of di erent types of cut.
The semantic anomaly. The truth-tables provide a de nition of the meaning of the logical operators in terms of the truth and falsity of their operands, where the notions of truth and falsity involved are the classical ones. These notion are governed by two basic principles: Non-Contradiction (no proposition can be true and false at the same time) and Bivalence (every proposition is either true or false, and there are no other possibilities). It is commonly assumed that there is a close correspondence between the tableau method and classical semantics. Tableaux, in turn, are closely related to cut-free proofs in a certain version of the classical sequent calculus (Kleene's In all models and for all propositions A, either A is true or A is false.
But this is the Principle of Bivalence, one of the two fundamental principles which characterize the classical notions of truth and falsity. While the Principle of NonContradiction is clearly embodied in the rule for closing a branch, there is no rule in the tableau method (and in cut-free Gentzen systems) which corresponds to the Principle of Bivalence. While enumerating all the possible cases, the tableau rules allow for the possibility of a proposition's being something else other than true or false 3 .
The computational anomaly. It has been well-known since the origins of the studies on the relative complexity of proof systems that there are classes of propositional formulae whose shortest proofs in a cut-free system, like Smullyan's analytic tableaux, are signi cantly longer than their shortest proofs in systems, like natural deduction or Hilbert-style axiomatic systems, that allow for some form of cut. (The rst proof of this fact was provided by 32], although it could already be read o some of view, the notion of formal derivability based on the tableau method does not satisfy the transitivity principle. To put it with Boolos: \modus ponens, or cut, is obviously a valid derived rule of standard natural deduction systems, but not obviously a valid derived rule of the method of trees" 4, p. 373]. We shall now make this claim more precise. What do we mean by a \simple" procedure? First, it seems reasonable to require that the procedure be uniform, that is, does not depend on the particular proofs we want to combine. Second, it should be purely structural, that is, it should not depend on the meaning of any particular logical constant. Since transitivity is a structural property, which does not depend on the meaning of any logical constant, it should be seen to be valid by virtue of structural properties only. But this is not the case with the tableau method: the cut-elimination procedure heavily depends on the given rules for the logical operators. Cut is not eliminable if other rules are taken as primitive.
Finally, it is natural to require that a \simple" procedure for implementing the transitivity of ordinary proofs be feasible. Concatenation of proofs is feasible in the ordinary deductive practice and should be feasible in any realistic formal model of this practice. We are, therefore, led to formulate the following condition which has to be satis ed by any acceptable formal model of the notion of a classical proof:
Strong Transitivity Principle (STP): Proof-concatenation should be feasible and uniform. More precisely, let jTj denote the size of the proof T (ie the number of steps in it). There must be a uniform, structural procedure, which, given a proof T 1 of A from ? 1 ; B and a proof T 2 of B from ? 2 , yields a proof T 3 of A from ? 1 ; ? 2 such that jT 3 j = jT 1 j+jT 2 j+c, for some xed constant c depending on the system. In other word we require that the transitivity property be a valid derived rule in a particularly strict sense. (In 12] D'Agostino discusses this stricter notion of a derived rule and its implications on the complexity of proof systems.) The tableau method fails to satisfy our strong transitivity principle and so cannot be considered an adequate formalization of our intuitions about classical proofs. Of course, as we have pointed out above, the tableau method satis es a weak transitivity principle, which requires only a procedure to construct T 3 out of T 1 and T 2 , without any further constraints. This procedure is the cut-elimination procedure. Given a closed tableau T 1 for ? 1 ; B; :A (a proof of A from ? 1 ; B), and a closed tableau T 2 for ? 2 ; :B (a proof of B from ? 2 ), we can apply the cut-elimination procedure to construct a closed tableau for ? 1 ; ? 2 ; :A (a proof of A from ? 1 ; ? 2 ). However, this procedure is not uniform, it depends on the speci c form of the tableau rules for the logical operators, and does not satisfy the complexity constraint: in general jT 3 j is not even bounded above by any polynomial of jT 1 j + jT 2 j. This means that there are forms of arguments that cannot be expressed e ectively by cut-free systems. Thus, cut-free systems, as such, cannot be taken as adequate formalizations of ordinary deductive practice, for which the cut rule is essential.
The obvious objection to this argument sounds as follows: cut-free systems do not claim to provide an adequate formal model for any kind of arguments that may occur in ordinary deductive practice, but only for a particular subclass of these arguments | those that Gentzen called analytic | characterized by the subformula property. However, as we shall see, the traditional claim that classical analytic deduction is is to investigate the role of analytic cut in classical proofs and present an alternative formalization of classical analytic deduction which avoids the conceptual and technical di culties of the cut-free tradition.
After pointing out, in section 2 the basic anomalies of cut-free systems, we address the problem of formulating a refutation system for classical logic which is as close as possible to the tableau method but is not a ected by its anomalies. For this purpose, in section 3 we present an alternative refutation system for classical logic, that we call KE. This system, though being \close" to Smullyan's tableau method, is not cut-free but incorporates a form of classical cut which is not eliminable. This cut rule has the form of a branching rule corresponding to the classical principle of bivalence (which, as argued in section 2, cannot be expressed properly in the standard tableau method). As a result of allowing the cut rule, the analysis of the logical operators does not require the standard branching rules of tableaux but can be carried out entirely in terms of linear rules. Analytic deductions are then obtained by restricting the cut rule to analytic applications, i.e. applications that do not violate the subformula principle. In section 4 we show that such analytic restriction of KE is complete and outline a canonical refutation procedure which has the same \mechanical" character as the usual tableau procedure. In section 5 we discuss the relative complexity of KE and prove some simulation and separation results. In particular, we show that the analytic restriction of KE, while preserving all the interesting properties of Smullyan's tableaux and of cut-free systems | like the subformula principle and the possibility of systematic refutation procedures | uniformly and essentially improves on them from the complexity viewpoint: the analytic KE linearly simulates the tableau method but the tableau method cannot polynomially simulate the analytic KE. Moreover, in section 6, we show that a similar result holds true for any system which satis es a very general condition on the feasibility of (analytic) cut inferences.
Three anomalies of Smullyan's tableaux
If we construe Smullyan's analytic tableaux as a formalization of the notion of a classical refutation, we are faced with three, apparently independent, anomalies. We shall call them \the proof-theoretical anomaly", the \semantical anomaly" and \the computational anomaly" respectively. It turns out that these anomalies are all related and depend on a single aspect of Smullyan's system, namely on its being cut-free.
The proof-theoretical anomaly. Tableau proofs lack an important property of ordinary proofs, that is the possibility of \nesting" subproofs one into the other.
Suppose we want to prove A from assumptions in ?; the proof may turn out to be easier if we rst prove an auxiliary \lemma" B and then show A as a corollary of B. So we obtain a proof by combining two simpler proofs, of B from ? and of A, from ?; B. This is nothing but the transitivity property of ordinary deduction. In a sense, tableau proofs satisfy this property: the cut-elimination theorem provides an e ective procedure for obtaining the nal proof from the auxiliary ones. But in another sense they do not: \combining" two proofs via cut-elimination is no easier than throwing them away and starting the main proof from scratch. In contrast, to model the use of auxiliary conclusions or lemmata, we need a \simple" procedure. So, from this point cut-free systems, from the complexity viewpoint, even in the domain of analytic deduction. Hence, the speed-up of the analytic KE system does not depend on the form of the operational rules but only on the analytic cut rule.
The Dilemma of ATP
The method of analytic tableaux is a direct descendant of Gentzen's cut-free sequent calculus and is regarded as a paradigm of the notion of analytic deduction in classical logic. Moreover, it is today receiving considerable attention in the area of automated deduction as an alternative to resolution which does not require reduction into clausal form. In particular, it is commonly assumed that:
1. the tableau method provides an adequate formal model of classical deductions; 2. it re ects closely the semantics of classical logic; 3. it is well-suited to computational treatment. In this paper we defy these assumptions and point out three basic anomalies which a ect Smullyan's analytic tableaux (and Gentzen's cut-free sequent calculus) from the proof-theoretical, the semantical and the computational point of view. We trace back all these anomalies to what is usually considered the main merit of analytic tableaux, namely to their being cut-free: cuts cannot be eliminated without highly undesirable side-e ects.
However, it is commonly argued, introducing the cut rule would destroy the analytic character of proofs which would no longer obey the subformula principle. So their discovery would become extremely di cult, and the resulting system would not be suitable for algorithmic purposes. The set of formulae to which the cut rule can be applied coincides with the totality of the formulae. Thus the introduction of cut among the rules would result in an uncontrollable search space. We seem, then, to be faced with a dilemma: either we disallow the cut rule and tolerate the anomalies of cut-free proofs, or we allow the cut rule and give up the analytic property of deductions, so making any systematic search for proofs impossible. We argue that this is a false dilemma which depends on a long-lasting dogma of proof-theory, namely the dogma that Gentzen's formalization of analytic deduction in terms of cut-free proofs provides a de nitive paradigm. In fact, as Smullyan once remarked, \the real importance of cut-free proofs is not the elimination of cuts per se, but rather that such proofs obey the subformula principle." The subformula principle does not require the elimination of cuts. It is su cient that the applications of the cut rule are restricted to subformulae, i.e. only \analytic" cuts are allowed. Apart from Smullyan's short paper cited above, however, the proof-theory of such analytic cut systems, has not been adequately studied, and the same is true of their relative complexity 2 . It turns out that they are by no means equivalent to cut-free systems. Indeed, they signi cantly improve on them both from the conceptual and from the computational viewpoint. From this vantage point, the traditional approach which identi es analytic deduction with cut-free proofs appears to be a logical overkill. The goal of this paper The method of analytic tableaux is a direct descendant of Gentzen's cutfree sequent calculus and is regarded as a paradigm of the notion of analytic deduction in classical logic. However, cut-free systems are anomalous from the proof-theoretical, the semantical and the computational point of view. Firstly, they cannot represent the use of auxiliary lemmas in proofs. Secondly, they cannot express the bivalence of classical logic. Thirdly, they are extremely ine cient, as is emphasized by the \computational scandal" that such systems cannot polynomially simulate the truth-tables. None of these anomalies occurs if the cut rule is allowed. This raises the problem of formulating a proof system which incorporates a cut rule and yet can provide a suitable model of classical analytic deduction. For this purpose we present an alternative refutation system for classical logic, that we call KE. This system, though being \close" to Smullyan's tableau method, is not cut-free but includes a classical cut rule which is not eliminable. Analytic deductions are then obtained by restricting the cut rule to analytic applications, namely applications that do not violate the subformula principle. It turns out that this analytic restriction of the KE system shares all the interesting properties of Smullyan's tableau method and of cut-free systems | it obeys the subformula principle and admits systematic refutation procedures | but uniformly and essentially improves on them from the complexity viewpoint. In particular, we show that the analytic KE system linearly simulates the tableau method, but the tableau method cannot p-simulate the analytic KE system. Finally, we show that every proof system that can simulate the cut rule in a constant number of steps is strictly more powerful than
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